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Abstract
This paper studies the design of unemployment insurance when neither the searching
effort nor the savings of an unemployed agent can be monitored. If the principal could
monitor the savings, the optimal policy would leave the agent savings-constrained. With a
constant absolute risk-aversion (CARA) utility function, we obtain a closed form solution
of the optimal contract. Under the optimal contract, the agent is neither saving nor bor-
rowing constrained. Counter-intuitively, his consumption declines faster than implied by
Hopenhayn and Nicolini [4]. The efficient allocation can be implemented by an increasing
benefit during unemployment and a constant tax during employment.
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1 Introduction
Unemployment insurance must balance the benefits of insurance against the concern that
an over-generous program will discourage search effort. Card, Chetty, and Weber [3] provide
evidence that search effort varies according to an agent’s financial situation. They find that
exogenously richer agents take longer to find a job but do not find higher wages on their next
job. In other words, it seems that wealth is one important determinant in the search effort
decision.
Since neither search effort nor wealth are readily observable to the planner, it is natural to
wonder how these information frictions might affect the optimal unemployment system. We
introduce hidden savings into an environment similar to the Hopenhayn and Nicolini [4] version
of the model of Shavell and Weiss [7]. We show that the addition of hidden savings leads to
faster consumption declines during an unemployment spell than the declines in a model with
observable savings. Moreover, with hidden savings, agents with relatively high initial insurance
claims have the fastest rate of consumption decline, eventually having lower claims than those
agents who started out receiving less. We show that the unemployment benefit rises over the
course of the spell.
Hidden savings is naturally relevant in repeated moral hazard models like this one. When
savings can be monitored, as in Hopenhayn and Nicolini [4] or the repeated moral hazard
model of Rogerson [6], the optimal policy leaves the agent savings-constrained: his marginal
utility is lower today than tomorrow. By making an agent poor in the future, it encourages
the agent to search harder for a job.
Our paper is related to both Werning [9, 10] and Abraham and Pavoni [1, 2], who use the
first-order approach to study models with hidden savings and borrowing. Briefly speaking, the
first-order approach studies a relaxed problem, which replaces the incentive constraints in the
original problem with some first-order conditions of the agent. In these papers, the first-order
condition for the type that has never deviated in previous periods and thus has zero hidden
wealth is imposed.
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Werning [9] acknowledges that imposing first-order conditions may not be sufficient to
ensure incentive compatibility. Furthermore, Kocherlakota [5] shows that when the disutility
function is linear, the agent’s problem is severely non-convex and the first-order condition
cannot be sufficient. When the first-order approach is invalid, the number of state variables
in a recursive formulation would be infinite, making even numerical computations intractable.
We overcome this problem by focusing on a special case of constant absolute risk-aversion
(CARA) utility from consumption and linear disutility of effort. In this case we conjecture
and verify the countable set of constraints that bind. With this in hand, it is straightforward
to explicitly solve for the principal’s optimum. It has the interesting feature that the incentive
constraints of the searching agent never bind. Instead, the binding incentive constraint in any
period is the one for the agent who has always shirked, and meanwhile saved.
The basic intuition for this structure of binding incentive constraints relates to the way in
which shirking and saving interact. When an agent shirks, he increases the odds of continuing
to be unemployed. The unemployed state involves lower consumption, so he wants to save in
preparation for the greater probability of this low outcome. Therefore, saving and shirking
are complements. The agent who saves the most is the one who has always done maximum
shirking, and who knew he would never become employed. Given that he has saved the most, he
is best equipped to do additional shirking, which is, again, complementary with saving. This
example shows, in two ways, the sense in which the first-order approach is not appropriate
for this kind of problem: first, the complementarity between shirking and saving can make
the first-order condition for effort insufficient for optimality, and second, since the binding
incentive constraint is not for the agent who always searches, it is not enough to look at the
always-searching agent’s optimality condition in the first place.
The contract we study always implements, at an optimum, a one-time lottery over always
searching as hard as possible, or always searching the least, which we refer to as not searching.
The interesting case is when the agent searches. The reason for keeping the agent on the
Euler equation in this case relates to the savings-constrained nature of the optimal contract in
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Hopenhayn and Nicolini [4]. There, making the agent poor in the future generates incentives
to search today. When the agent can freely save, it is no longer possible to keep the marginal
utility of consumption high tomorrow, but there is still no reason to make it fall over time. In
that case, the same logic as in the case with observable savings would suggest lowering today’s
marginal utility and raising tomorrow’s in order to increase search incentives today and make
the contract deliver utility more efficiently. As a result, the agent is on the Euler equation.
As a corollary, our solution would also be the solution to a case where the agent had access to
both hidden borrowing and hidden savings.
In the state-of-the-art model of optimal unemployment insurance in Shimer and Werning
[8], the focus is on the wage-draw aspect of the Shavell and Weiss [7] structure.1 The funda-
mental trade-off is between search time and quality of match (in terms of wages). They find
that the optimal contract has constant benefits (for CARA utility, and approximately so for
constant relative risk-aversion (CRRA) utility), and keeps the agent on the Euler equation.
The reason why their agents are not borrowing constrained is different from ours, however. In
the CARA model, the agent’s reservation wage is independent of wealth; therefore, there is no
incentive benefit from distorting the first-order condition, and there is the usual resource cost to
the principal from the distortion. In that sense their model has no “wealth effects” of the kind
emphasized by Card, Chetty, and Weber [3]. Our model, on the other hand, does have wealth
effects; richer agents have less incentive to give effort than poorer agents. Hopenhayn and
Nicolini [4] show that there is an incentive benefit in making the agent savings-constrained; in
our model such a constraint is impossible, so the optimal contract moves to the Euler equation.
The case where search effort is a monetary cost and utility is CARA is studied in Werning
[9]. Monetary search cost implies that poor agents have no greater incentives than rich agents,
1It is worth noting that empirical evidence in favor of both the wage-draw view and the search theoretic view
of unemployment exists. We have stressed the evidence, such as Card, Chetty, and Weber [3], that emphasizes
search. However, recent research suggests that actual time used in search by the unemployed is very small,
suggesting that compensating the disutility of search may not be as important a feature of unemployment
systems.
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since the cost and benefit of search are both proportional to wealth. The main insight of
this model is similar to Shimer and Werning [8]: agents are not borrowing constrained and a
constant benefit sequence is needed to implement the optimal allocation.
Our results contrast with Kocherlakota [5], who studies a similar model with linear disutil-
ity of effort, but assumes that the principal aims at implementing interior effort. He finds that
agents are borrowing constrained. In contrast, we show that the optimal contract always im-
plements corner solutions for effort. The optimal contract does not leave the agents borrowing
constrained, even if doing so is feasible for the principal.
The first-order approach remains a practical and useful method to solve hidden-savings
problems when the disutility function is sufficiently convex. In particular, Abraham and Pavoni
[1] numerically verify the incentive compatibility of the solution obtained with the first-order
approach for a large range of convex disutility functions. Abraham and Pavoni [2] show ana-
lytically, in a two-period model, that the first-order approach is valid if the utility function has
the non-increasing absolute risk aversion property, and the job-finding probability (as a func-
tion of effort) satisfies some concavity condition. Williams [11] provides sufficient conditions
for the first-order approach based on the Hamiltonian in a continuous-time model.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we introduce the basic model. In Section
3 we show that the optimal contract either implements high effort forever or no effort forever.
In Section 4 we solve for the optimal contract to implement high effort. In Section 5 we show
the important characteristics of the optimal contract, and compare them to the case without
hidden savings. We then conclude. All proofs are contained in the Appendix.
2 The Problem
In this section we describe an unemployment insurance model in the spirit of Shavell and
Weiss [7]. There is a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse agent. The preferences of the
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agent are
E
∞∑
t=0
βt [u(ct)− at] ,
where ct ∈ R and at ∈ [0, 1] are consumption and search effort at time t, u(c) = − exp(−γc)
is a constant absolute risk-aversion (CARA) utility function, β < 1 is the discount factor,
and E is the expectations operator. An agent can be employed or unemployed; he begins life
unemployed. The choice of at affects the probability of becoming employed for an unemployed
agent. Specifically, if an agent is unemployed in period t, then the probability of his becoming
employed in period t+ 1 is πat, and the probability of his staying unemployed is 1− πat. We
assume π ∈ (0, 1), which implies that the agent might not find a job even if he exerts full
effort.2 As in Hopenhayn and Nicolini [4], employment is an absorbing state: if an agent is
employed in period t, he earns wage w > 0 forever.
The agent’s employment status is observable to others, but his choice of at is unobservable.
The agent can also secretly hold a non-negative amount of assets. The principal can observe
neither the consumption nor the savings of the agent. A contract σ in this environment
specifies three sequences, ({cUt }
∞
t=0, {c
E
t }
∞
t=1, {at}
∞
t=0). Given such a contract, an agent who
is unemployed in period t receives compensation cUt from the principal. If an agent became
employed for the first time in period t, then his compensation from the principal in period
s ≥ t is cEt . Thus, once an agent is employed, his compensation is constant over time. It
is simple to show that, because the principal and agent have the same discount factor, this
smooth compensation is efficient in this economy, so, to save on notation, we impose that
feature now. The contract will also recommend an effort level at, and, given that the principal
cannot observe at, at will be designed to satisfy incentive constraints. To simplify notation,
we will let Ut = −u(c
U
t ) and Et = −u(c
E
t ). Notice that Ut and Et are proportional to the
marginal utility of consumption, where the constant of proportionality is γ.
Without loss of generality, we require that there be no incentive for the agent to save if
2If full effort led to sure employment, the principal could simply recommend full effort and promise grave
punishment if a job were not found.
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he follows the recommended strategy {at}
∞
t=0. This is true if and only if all the first-order
conditions are satisfied,
Ut ≥ (atπ)Et+1 + (1− atπ)Ut+1, for all t ≥ 0. (1)
We refer to this condition as the Euler equation. Note that once the agent chooses a different
search effort a˜t 6= at, Eq. (1) may be violated, and the agent holds positive assets.
In the literature, a deviation in effort combined with hidden savings is called a joint de-
viation by the agent. Hidden savings is an additional friction that makes the contract more
difficult to solve than a traditional dynamic contracting problem without hidden savings or
borrowing, since it adds a constraint to the problem of the principal. Therefore, we introduce
some notations to describe all the incentive constraints.
We must consider a variety of possible deviations. For instance, suppose {a˜t}
∞
t=0 is the
agent’s search strategy. If there is a finite t¯, such that a˜t = at,∀t ≥ t¯, then {a˜t}
∞
t=0 is called a
finite-deviation strategy. Otherwise it is called an infinite-deviation strategy. Let V ({a˜t}
∞
t=0)
be an agent’s ex ante utility if he uses strategy {a˜t}
∞
t=0 and privately saves. The incentive
compatibility (I.C.) constraints will be written as
V ({at}
∞
t=0) ≥ V ({a˜t}
∞
t=0), for all {a˜t}
∞
t=0. (2)
However, in much of the following discussions, we only examine incentive constraints for finite-
deviation strategies. This is without loss of generality, because the payoff of an infinite-
deviation strategy can be approximated as closely as possible by those of finite-deviation
strategies.
Let Dt denote the expected discounted (to period 0) disutility of efforts {as}
∞
s=t conditional
on not finding a job at the beginning of period t,
Dt =
∞∑
s=t
βs(Πs−1k=t(1− akπ))as.
This can be generated recursively by Dt = β
tat + (1 − atπ)Dt+1; D0 would be the value of
the total discounted disutility for an agent. Since disutility is linear and one unit of labor
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is compensated with βπw/(1 − β) units of wage income, βπwD0/(1 − β) is the expected
wage income that the principal can obtain. The expected cost for the principal is equal to
the discounted value of consumption goods delivered to the agent, minus the expected wage
income,
C(σ) =
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
Πt−1s=0(1− asπ)
) [
cUt + βatπ
cEt+1
1− β
]
−
βπw
1− β
D0.
The problem of the principal is to choose a contract σ to minimize C(σ), subject to the I.C.
constraints (2), the Euler equation (1), and the delivery of an initial promised utility V¯ .
3 Optimal Effort
In this section we take up the question of what levels of effort the principal will implement.
We show that the principal can do best by offering an initial lottery over full effort forever
(at = 1,∀t ≥ 0 is denoted by {1}
∞
t=0), or no effort forever (at = 0,∀t ≥ 0 is denoted by {0}
∞
t=0).
Along the way we show that, at the optimally recommended effort level, the agent is always
on the Euler equation; in other words, Eq. (1) holds with equality. Thus, no shirkers will be
borrowing constrained. Since shirkers’ efforts are below the maximum, they have incentives
to hold a positive amount of savings. This result is relevant for two reasons. First, it helps
us with the analysis of the principal’s problem in the next section. Second, it shows that our
results for the model with hidden savings carry over to the case where the agent has access to
opportunities for both hidden saving and borrowing, since the ability of the principal to make
the agent borrowing constrained is never used.
First we verify that, in any incentive compatible (I.C.) contract in which at > 0, the agent’s
consumption in period t+ 1 after an unemployment shock is below that after an employment
shock, i.e., cUt+1 < c
E
t+1. This result is intuitive because punishment is necessary to induce
effort. It merits a proof because although the continuation utility after a good shock is
u(cEt+1)
1−β ,
the continuation utility after a bad shock is not uniquely pinned down by u(cUt+1).
Lemma 1 Let σ be an I.C. contract. If at > 0, then c
U
t+1 < c
E
t+1.
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Second we show that in any period where either full effort or no effort is implemented, the
Euler equation holds with equality.
Lemma 2 Let σ be an optimal contract. If at ∈ {0, 1}, then
Ut = atπEt+1 + (1− atπ)Ut+1. (3)
When at = 0, the result is simple: there is no reason not to let Ut = Ut+1 = Et+1, since
there is no effort to induce. The more interesting case is that of at = 1. For an agent with no
hidden wealth, the benefit of eliminating the borrowing constraint is analogous to the “inverse
Euler equation” logic of Hopenhayn and Nicolini [4] and Rogerson [6]: by moving consumption
from t + 1 to t (and, thereby, raising the marginal utility tomorrow relative to today), the
incentive to search rises, because a greater marginal utility tomorrow makes finding a job more
beneficial. In the CARA case, for an agent with no hidden savings, the algebra is especially
simple: the marginal benefit of effort is proportional to βπ(−Et+1 + Ut+1), so if the principal
reduces consumption tomorrow uniformly by δ and raises it today by ǫ < βδ, leaving unchanged
the utility for the agent who chooses the recommended effort (at = 1), the marginal benefit of
effort increases by a factor of eδ. Of course, in addition, the principal saves resources for the
given level of delivered utility by reducing the intertemporal distortion.
Lemma 2 must also consider whether smoothing consumption for the agent with no hidden
wealth would violate incentive constraint for agents with hidden savings. In that case, consider
a plan of some level of period t hidden wealth st−1/β, an action in period t denoted a˜t, and
a level of wealth in period t + 1, st/β. The proof of the lemma shows that the proposed
modification to the contract reduces the payoff to all combinations of st−1/β, a˜t, and st/β.
To see the logic, consider first an agent with st/β > 0. Since this agent is already on the
Euler equation, he must be made worse off by receiving less expected discounted resources. On
the other hand, consider an agent with hidden savings at t who saves nothing for t+ 1. This
agent consumes the entire allocation cUt in period t, plus his wealth st−1/β; from period t+ 1
onward, he is just like the agent who works the recommended amount. As a result, this agent
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gains less from the proposed change; his marginal utility in period t is lower than the agent
who starts with no hidden wealth, and therefore he benefits less from moving consumption
forward from t+ 1 to t.
Lemmas 1 and 2 imply that, when at = 1, the shirker is not borrowing constrained either.
Since Ut = πEt+1 + (1− π)Ut+1 and Et+1 < Ut+1, shirking (a˜t < 1) implies
Ut < a˜tπEt+1 + (1− a˜tπ)Ut+1.
Therefore, the shirker always secretly saves and chooses his consumption to restore the Euler
equation.
Next, we introduce a result from Kocherlakota [5], that with linear disutility, interior effort
can only be implemented when the agent is borrowing constrained:
Lemma 3 (Kocherlakota [5]) Let σ be an I.C. contract. If at ∈ (0, 1), then Ut > atπEt+1 +
(1− atπ)Ut+1.
A key feature of the linear disutility model with interior effort is that, for any consumption
sequence across states and dates, the agent is indifferent between all effort levels. Intuitively,
linear disutility makes the model analogous to the case of effort being either zero or one, and
at ∈ (0, 1) representing a mixed strategy. With the opportunity to also save, the agent has
a further option: shirk and save. This option is attractive unless the contract makes saving
unattractive by making the marginal utility high today. With observable savings, the agent’s
value function is linear in at, since the disutility function is linear. However, with hidden
savings, when the agent is on the Euler equation, there is a second-order effect. Whenever the
agent lowers at, he would save to smooth consumption, which makes the value function convex
in at. This second-order effect cannot be made unprofitable when the agent is on the Euler
equation.
A closely related feature in the linear disutility model is that implementing interior effort
implies that, for the given consumption sequence, the principal is indifferent between imple-
menting any level of effort a. So, starting from at ∈ (0, 1) and fixing consumption across states,
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the principal (and the agent) should be willing to replace the recommended at with at = 1.
Since the agent is borrowing constrained at at < 1, he is further borrowing constrained at
at = 1 (since his expected marginal utility of consumption tomorrow is lower when he searches
harder). The principal then has a profitable sort of double deviation: move to at = 1 and
adjust the consumption sequence to return the agent to the Euler equation. This must make
the principal strictly better off by the line of argument in Lemma 2. We therefore have
Corollary 1 It is never optimal for the principal to implement interior effort at ∈ (0, 1).
At this point we know that any optimal effort sequence uses only ones and zeros. However,
it turns out that the principal would always prefer to implement a lottery over a sequence of
all ones and all zeros rather than implement a sequence that contains both ones and zeros.
Lemma 4 Any sequence of effort levels {at}
∞
t=0 where at = 0 for some t and at′ = 1 for some t
′
is dominated by a simple lottery with two outcomes: either {1}∞t=0, or with the complementary
probability, {0}∞t=0.
For instance, consider the sequence {at}
∞
t=0 = (0, 1, 1, 1, ...). Alternately, the principal could
make the agent search hard immediately, with probability β, and let the agent rest forever with
probability 1− β. If savings were observed, the outcome would be no better or worse for both
principal and agent. However, by choosing the lottery, the principal eliminates the possibility
of hidden savings before search begins in period t = 1, which is possible under the sequence
that starts with a period of zero effort. Eliminating this possibility eliminates a profitable
deviation for the agent, and is therefore beneficial for the principal. More generally, the proof
shows that periods where the agent is not searching are costly because of the hidden-savings
possibilities they generate.
We are now ready to state the main result of this section, which gathers the previous
results. It states that whenever the principal implements any effort, he implements high effort
forever.
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Proposition 1 Suppose the principal has access to a one-time lottery before time 0. For any
outcome of the lottery where at > 0 for any t, the principal implements at = 1 for all t ≥ 0.
Moreover, Ut = πEt+1 + (1− π)Ut+1 and shirkers are not borrowing constrained.
In the next section we take up the issue of how to implement full effort forever. The Euler
equation will be an aid in tackling that problem.
4 Implementing Full Effort Forever
We now focus on the problem of implementing full effort forever,
min
{cUt }
∞
t=0,{c
E
t }
∞
t=1
C(σ) (4)
s.t. Ut = πEt+1 + (1− π)Ut+1,
V¯ = V ({1}∞t=0),
V ({1}∞t=0) ≥ V ({a˜t}
∞
t=0), for all {a˜t}
∞
t=0. (5)
We solve problem (4) in two steps. First, we use the CARA assumption to solve the shirker’s
problem in a closed form; that is, for any sequence {a˜t}, we compute the expected discounted
utility V ({a˜t}
∞
t=0) for that plan after optimally undertaking hidden saving. Second, we conjec-
ture that the binding incentive constraint for effort at = 1 is for agents who shirk up to t− 1
(a˜s = 0, for all 0 ≤ s ≤ t− 1), and search hard thereafter (a˜s = 1, for all s ≥ t). These agents
are referred to as the always-shirking-up-to-(t−1) types. We solve a relaxed problem where we
impose only the incentive constraints for those deviations, and show that the solution satisfies
Eq. (5) and is therefore a solution to the full problem (4).
4.1 Utility after deviation
Suppose an agent chooses a finite-deviation strategy {a˜s}
∞
s=0, and engages in hidden saving.
With the CARA utility assumption, we can solve the hidden-savings problem in closed form:
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Lemma 5 Suppose an agent chooses a finite-deviation strategy {a˜s}
∞
s=0, where a˜s = 1,∀s ≥ t
for some t. Then the agent’s discounted utility from consumption with hidden savings is
−
U1−β0
[
a˜0πE1 + (1− a˜0π)U
1−β
1
[
a˜1πE2 + (1− a˜1π)U
1−β
2
[
... [a˜t−1πEt + (1− a˜t−1π)Ut]
β ...
]β]β]β
1− β
. (6)
Formula (6) is derived by backwards induction, using the agent’s Euler equations and
CARA preferences repeatedly. Euler equations provide a relationship between marginal utili-
ties across times. However, under the assumption of CARA utility, this is also a relationship
between levels of utilities from consumption, which we use to construct (6). Note that in gen-
eral such an avenue is not available, since statements about marginal utility do not translate
directly to level of utility; even for CRRA utility the t-period hidden-savings problem is not
tractable.
4.2 Showing which constraints bind: a relaxed problem
We conjecture that the binding constraints are the ones for always-shirking-up-to-(t − 1)
types. The intuition comes from the fact that shirking and saving are complements, so that
shirking at time t is best combined with prior saving. Prior saving, in turn, is most valuable
when prior shirking guaranteed that employment would not occur.
To show that these constraints are in fact the relevant ones, consider the relaxed problem
min
σ
C(σ) (7)
s.t Ut = πEt+1 + (1− π)Ut+1, for all t ≥ 0,
V¯ = −
U0
1− β
−
1
1− β(1− π)
, (8)
V¯ ≥ −
(
Πt−1s=0U
(1−β)βs
s
)
Uβ
t
t
1− β
−
βt
1− β(1− π)
, for all t ≥ 1. (9)
Note that formula (6) is crucial for the relaxed problem. Without it, we are unable to
write the incentive constraints (9) in closed form. In the appendix, we also use (6) to obtain
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a closed-form solution to (7). Without a closed-form solution to (7), we cannot establish the
equivalence between the relaxed problem (7) and the full problem (4), and hence cannot solve
the model.
First, we show in the relaxed problem that all the I.C. constraints bind.
Lemma 6 In the optimal solution to problem (7), all the I.C. constraints bind.
The relaxed problem has an equal number of choice variables and constraints. However,
to understand why all the constraints bind, it is useful to explain the intuition that these
constraints are independent. With change of variables xt = c
U
t−1 − c
U
t = log(Ut/Ut−1)/γ, the
constraints in Eq. (9) can be rewritten as
t∑
s=1
βsxs =
1
γ
log
(
−V¯ −
βt
1− β(1 − π)
)
−
1
γ
log
(
−V¯ −
1
1− β(1 − π)
)
.
Heuristically, we could pick a period T = 10 and divide the constraints into two groups, the
“early” incentive constraints with t ≤ T , and the “late” ones (t > T ), and then pick one from
each group. For example, we pick the incentive constraint for t = 10 from the first group and
t =∞ from the second group, and consider the constraints:
10∑
s=1
βsxs ≥
1
γ
log
(
−V −
β10
1− β(1− π)
)
−
1
γ
log
(
−V −
1
1− β(1− π)
)
, (10)
∞∑
s=1
βsxs ≥
1
γ
log (−V )−
1
γ
log
(
−V −
1
1− β(1− π)
)
. (11)
If inequality (10) binds and inequality (11) is slack, then, as xs (s > 10) does not appear in
inequality (10), xs = 0 in the solution, which means that consumption is flat in later periods: a
contradiction to the fact that the principal wants to implement high effort in all time periods.
If (11) binds and (10) is slack, then the principal knows that the shirking type will shirk in
all time periods, and thus would reach the unemployment state Ut with probability one, while
the equilibrium type would reach Ut with smaller and smaller probabilities as t gets bigger.
Therefore, for efficiency reasons, the principal would like the distortion xt to be increasing,
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and minimize the punishment in the early periods that the searcher hits relatively often.3 This
implies that
10∑
s=1
βsxs < (1− β
10)
[
1
γ
log(−V )−
1
γ
log
(
−V −
1
1− β(1− π)
)]
.
But the concavity of the function log(·) implies that
log
(
−V −
β10
1− β(1− π)
)
− log
(
−V −
1
1− β(1 − π)
)
> (1− β10)
[
log(−V )− log
(
−V −
1
1− β(1 − π)
)]
,
contradicting (10). The proof extends this intuition to show that, if any constraint did not
bind, the solution would imply an infeasible choice for that t.
Now we verify that the solution to the relaxed problem satisfies all the incentive constraints
in the full problem.
Lemma 7 If all the I.C. constraints bind in the relaxed problem (7), then
V ({1}∞s=0) ≥ V ({a˜s}
∞
s=0),
for all {a˜s}
∞
s=0 where a˜s = 1,∀s ≥ t+1 for some t. Therefore the solution to the relaxed problem
(7) satisfies all the incentive constraints (5), and is thus the solution to the full problem (4).
Instead of proving V ({1}∞s=0) ≥ V ({a˜s}
∞
s=0) directly, we show that the agent is (weakly)
worse off if he decreases his effort in period t from 1 to a˜t, i.e,
V ({a˜s}
t−1
s=0, 1) ≥ V ({a˜s}
t−1
s=0, a˜t).
This is sufficient to prove the lemma because we can then apply backward induction to roll
the logic back to s = 0. For simplicity, we provide the intuition for the case of a˜t = 0 only and
leave the discussion of a˜t ∈ (0, 1) to the appendix.
3In fact, in the proof we show that the sequence of xs is decreasing when all the constraints bind in the
relaxed problem.
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Recall that we refer to the agent with as = 0 for s ≤ t − 1 as the always-shirking-up-to-
(t − 1) agent. The binding incentive constraints V ({0}t−1s=0, 1) = V ({0}
t−1
s=0, 0) says that this
agent is indifferent when he decreases his effort from 1 to 0 in period t. Using this fact, the
lemma shows that the policy successfully induces effort in period t for any agent who may have
worked at some point in the past.
The fundamental economics can be described in terms of wealth levels of different agents.
The agent who has always shirked has had the greatest incentive to save, since he knows in
every period that his future income is low, and therefore his marginal utility of consumption in
the future is the highest. The always-shirking agent therefore has the greatest amassed wealth
of workers of any effort history. As a result, the reduction in consumption that comes with
a lower future entitlement (cUt+1 instead of c
E
t+1) impacts the always-shirking agent the least,
since his wealth allows him to smooth consumption. Agents who have worked in the past have
less wealth, and therefore less ability to smooth consumption. If the always-shirking agent,
who is well-prepared for low entitlements, finds it worth searching, then the “poorer” agents,
who have the same disutility of search and a greater disutility from a low future entitlement,
find it worthwhile to search as well. An implication of the lemma is that the binding incentive
constraint at time t is for an agent who always shirks up to time t − 1, and then works at t,
and not for the agent who gives high search effort in every period.
In the next section we return, then, to the relaxed problem to develop some details of the
optimal contract.
5 Analysis of the Optimal Contract
5.1 Decline of consumption over an unemployment spell
We can analyze how consumption changes over an unemployment spell by looking at the
constraints in the relaxed problem. We have that
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Proposition 2 Ut/Ut−1 is decreasing in t, and
lim
t→∞
Ut
Ut−1
= lim
t→∞
exp(γxt) = exp
(
(1− β)
(−V¯ )β(1− β(1− π))
)
> 1. (12)
Since Ut is proportional to the negative of utility from consumption, utility from consump-
tion is falling at a decreasing rate, eventually reaching a constant rate of decline. In order to
achieve this, consumption must fall by a constant amount in the long run.
A useful comparison is to the case of observable savings.
Proposition 3 If savings are observed, as in Hopenhayn and Nicolini [4], then
lim
t→∞
(Ut − Ut−1) =
(1− β)2
β(1− β(1− π))
. (13)
In the observable savings case, the long-run decline in utility from consumption is a constant
amount, implying slower and slower declines in consumption in the long run. This shows
how unobservable savings can make an important difference in the optimal policy. When
savings are observed, consumption falls more and more slowly, because, in the long run, high
marginal utility makes small consumption declines translate into large utility declines; but
when consumption is unobserved, it cannot because the prospective shirker has more and
more hidden wealth.
Both our result and the one from Hopenhayn and Nicolini [4] contrast with Kocherlakota
[5], who finds the consumption of the unemployed to be constant. The reason is that, by
focusing on interior effort levels and linear disutility, Kocherlakota must make agents indifferent
between the implemented effort level, full effort, and no effort. This affords no flexibility for
time varying consumption, since such a consumption path would always be exploitable by an
agent who combined saving with either too much or too little effort. In our model, the principal
only has to worry about agents giving too little effort, and therefore can make the consumption
path decline in order to motivate the agent.
In order to further describe the impact of hidden savings, we parameterize the model. As
in Hopenhayn and Nicolini [4], we view a period as representing a week and set β = 0.999 and
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the job-finding probability π = 0.1. Wage w is normalized to be 100. We pick γ = 0.06 so
that the agent has a constant relative risk aversion of 4 on average. Two simplifications that
were immaterial to our analytic results, but which are important in parameterization, need to
be addressed. The first is that we have fixed the disutility of effort at one to save notation;
we now parameterize that as d. Second, the model we introduced includes no work effort on
the job. Clearly agents should consider working to require effort as well. In the interests of
parsimony, we take this disutility to also be d. In our benchmark, we set d = 0.0473, so that
an agent with a job is willing to sacrifice 50% of income to avoid the disutility from working.
At the outset we note that the model is less well suited to calibration than Hopenhayn and
Nicolini [4]. The reasons are more than just the fact that we use CARA utility. Here disutility
from effort cannot be calibrated in the manner of Hopenhayn and Nicolini [4]. With interior
effort levels, there is a connection between the effort level and the job-finding probability, for
which we have data. In our model, where effort is at a corner, we can choose the appropriate
job-finding probability for the highest effort level, but we then essentially have d as a free
parameter. The choice of d is clearly important. For small d, there is almost no costly effort to
elicit. As a result, there is almost no required distortion in consumption without hidden savings,
and agents are nearly on their Euler equation in that case. This in turn implies that hidden
savings is not an important issue quantitatively; agents are not very savings constrained. On
the other hand, for sufficiently high d, the distortion can be made very dramatic. We therefore
will study other possible values of d below.
When the principal has a balanced budget, Figure 1 shows the unemployed worker’s utility
flows with and without hidden savings for the case with no possibility of initial wealth. The
labels on the right scale are for the corresponding consumption levels cUt . Figure 1 confirms the
above result that utilities decline faster with hidden savings; however, the two consumption
paths are not significantly different until the duration of unemployment exceeds 6 years.
The long period of similar consumption paths described in Figure 1 would suggest that
the effects of hidden savings on consumption distortion is not as large as that conjectured
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Figure 1: Utility flow of the unemployed.
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Figure 2: Utility flow of the unemployed with possibly hidden initial wealth.
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by previous researchers. However, another reason that the model is not as well suited for
calibration as Hopenhayn and Nicolini [4] is the treatment of initial wealth. In Hopenhayn and
Nicolini [4], one can simply take initial wealth as immaterial (because it is observed), or rolled
into initial promised utility (if one thinks that agents with more wealth are promised superior
contracts). Here, however, if we follow the line that initial wealth is hidden (as we assume about
subsequent wealth accumulation), then the initial wealth impacts crucially the agents’ ability
to subsequently shirk and utilize accumulated wealth. Wealth from sources other than saved
unemployment benefits, which would include typical financial wealth as well as sources such as
assistance from family, is certainly relevant for many people who find themselves unemployed
and is hard to monitor.
To get a basic idea about the possible quantitative role of hidden initial wealth, we do the
following. First, we assume that agents may have (hidden) initial wealth equivalent to 5% of
discounted lifetime income. Then the principal provides a contract for each initial wealth level
such that it is incentive compatible to report initial wealth truthfully. If we assume that agents
can only underreport wealth, then the contract for the rich agent is similar to the contract
analyzed before: since a report of positive wealth can only be made truthfully, the issue of
initial wealth is moot following such a report and the contract can proceed as above.
The important decision is then how to design the contract for the poor agent. Making the
contract unattractive to rich agents, while still eliciting effort, requires distortions. We do not
solve the problem of optimally trading off those distortions against the information rents that
the contract generates for the rich agent. Instead we compute the contract that elicits effort
from the rich agent, should he misreport his wealth as zero. We focus on such a contract for
two reasons. First, a contract that elicits effort from the rich agent will elicit effort from the
poor agent as well. The agent with initial wealth should be the hardest to motivate, as in
our results above, since his amassed wealth makes shirking more attractive. Second, among
all contracts that deliver a given level of utility to the poor agent, this contract is the least
attractive to the rich agent. Therefore offering such a contract to the poor agent dissuades
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rich agents as much as possible from claiming to be without initial wealth. In the extreme
case where the poor agents are very rare, this would be the optimal policy, since making the
contract unattractive to rich agents is more important than the distortions generated for the
(rare) poor agents.
Figure 2 shows the consumption path of the unemployed poor agent, compared to the path
in Hopenhayn and Nicolini [4]. Notice that the qualitative features of the paths are very similar
to the model with no hidden initial wealth; only the quantitative values change as a result of
hidden initial wealth. The difference comes from the fact that the path for the poor agent
must be sufficiently distorted as to make it unattractive to rich agents.
Next we consider the welfare effects of hidden savings and hidden initial wealth when we
vary d in the range of [0, 0.0473]. For each value of d, we first compute the promised utility, V0,
when the principal has balanced budget and there is no private information; in other words,
when the utility can be delivered with completely smooth consumption. The cost of that
policy is zero, so that the costs reported in Figure 3, where we allow for private search efforts
and compute the principal’s costs of delivering V0 to a poor agent in environments with and
without hidden savings, are measures of distortions in the consumption path. Figure 3 shows
that the impact of hidden initial wealth can be dramatic; in particular, throughout the range
of d hidden savings has roughly a doubling effect on the costly distortions. Note, as we would
expect, the level of the distortion increases in d, since there is more and more costly effort to
elicit as d rises.
Our numerical results suggest that studying hidden savings alone, as the literature has
done, and as we have followed in the development of our optimal contract here, may be only
the first step toward understanding the quantitative role of hidden wealth in the design of
the optimal unemployment insurance contract. A full quantitative treatment would require
understanding the role of hidden initial wealth in the problem. The qualitative features derived
here, however, seem likely to survive the hidden initial wealth case. Certainly the insights from
the contract without hidden initial wealth are essential to the study of the problem with hidden
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initial wealth.
5.2 Rank Reversals in Consumption
An interesting difference between our model and Hopenhayn and Nicolini [4] is that the
eventual decline in consumption depends on the initial promised utility when savings are
unobserved. This difference gives rise to rank reversals in consumption levels over the spell for
agents who start with different promised utilities. It is well known that in the case of observable
savings, a larger promised V¯ implies higher consumption at every node. That is not the case
with unobserved savings. An agent with higher promised utility gets greater consumption at
the start of the spell, but that extra consumption makes saving more tempting. In order to
undo the temptation to shirk and save, the rate of consumption decline must be faster for the
agent who consumes more initially; eventually his consumption is less than an agent with lower
initial promised utility.
Proposition 4 Consider two initial promised utility levels V¯ a > V¯ b. Then consumption is
initially higher under V¯ a but is eventually lower forever.
Despite this result, it is worth mentioning that, for large t, although the equilibrium type
from V¯ a is poorer than that from V¯ b, the always-shirking-up-to-(t− 1) type from V¯ a is always
richer. In other words, our results are consistent with the monotonicity in Hopenhayn and
Nicolini [4]: monotonicity is maintained for the wealth levels that are most likely to consider
one deviation, and whose incentive constraints bind. In Hopenhayn and Nicolini [4], there is
only one wealth level, that of zero wealth, and the agent is indifferent between shirking and
giving effort at t. Here the critical wealth level belongs to the always-shirking-up-to-(t − 1)
type, who is ex ante indifferent between his strategy and one more time period of shirking.
Notice that, since an always-shirking-up-to-(t − 1) type from V¯ a always obtains an ex ante
utility equivalent to the equilibrium type, he has secretly saved so much wealth so that even
if he faces lower future consumption claims, he is able to live better than an always-shirking-
up-to-(t− 1) type from V¯ b.
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5.3 Increasing unemployment benefits over the spell
Although the optimal consumption path is uniquely determined, Ricardian equivalence im-
plies that many transfer sequences, combined with asset markets, can achieve the optimum.
We pin down the benefit sequence (and the agent’s initial asset holdings) by having an em-
ployment tax of zero. Then benefits Bt can be obtained for all t from the budget constraint in
the optimal savings problem of the agent:
cUt +
βcEt+1
1− β
−Bt −
βw
1− β
=
cEt
1− β
−
w
1− β
,
which implies that
Bt = c
U
t +
w − cEt
1− β
− β
w − cEt+1
1− β
.
Analogous to Shimer and Werning [8], Bt is the insurance for the unemployment risk that an
agent faces at period t; w − Bt is the difference in the entitlements after finding a job and
not finding a job, and hence can be interpreted as the penalty for shirking. In our model, the
benefit Bt is strictly increasing with the duration of unemployment.
Proposition 5 Bt is strictly increasing in t.
It is well known that in Shimer and Werning [8], Bt is a constant. In their model, because
the effect of w − Bt on the reservation wage is independent of wealth, poor agents and rich
agents have the same incentives to accept an offer. Hence, the principal chooses a constant
penalty w − Bt regardless of the agent’s history or wealth level. In our model, the always-
shirking-up-to-(t− 1) type is richer than the always-shirking-up-to-t type. In period t, w−Bt
motivates the always-shirking-up-to-(t− 1) type; while in period t+1, w−Bt+1 motivates the
always-shirking-up-to-t type. Since it is more difficult to induce effort from richer agents in
our model, w −Bt needs to be larger than w −Bt+1. In other words, Bt is below Bt+1.
Intuitively, the rising benefit sequence is related to the similar one that Shavell and Weiss
[7] find for the case where job-finding probabilities are exogenous but borrowing and lending
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are allowed. There, the single force is consumption smoothing: higher marginal utilities in
later periods of the unemployment spell dictate higher shifting benefits to those states. In
their model the outcome is a very extreme jump from zero benefits to full benefits (equal to
the wage) at some two-period interval. Here, however, due to moral hazard, a wedge between
consumption when employed and unemployed must always be maintained.
6 Conclusion
Our paper is a first step toward solving mechanism design problems with hidden savings.
We have shown a case under which hidden savings (and, without loss of generality, borrowing)
leads to faster utility declines over an unemployment spell than for the contract in Hopenhayn
and Nicolini [4]. This result contrasts with the hidden-savings model of Kocherlakota [5], where
the rate of decline of utility over a spell of unemployment is zero. Further, our contract has
the feature that an agent with an initially higher consumption claim, due to higher promised
utility, may eventually have a lower claim than the agent with initially low consumption. This
non-monotonicity comes from the nature of the structure of the binding incentive constraints.
Our mode of attack relies on determining the binding incentive constraints. We use the
notion that types who shirk also want to save. That motive is central to Kocherlakota’s
argument about why the first-order approach to these problems might fail. We exploit this
feature to prove that the type that shirks the most (and saves the most) will be the hardest
agent from whom to extract effort. Therefore, that type has the binding incentive constraint.
Whereas the particular results depend on our assumptions on the functional forms, we believe
that the results point to what would happen in general when non-implemented types have
the binding constraints. The double-deviation incentives make such a structure of binding
constraints natural and lead to the results that differ from those in the literature. In particular,
the principal must block the possibility of shirking and saving by making a more dramatic
decline in the rate of consumption. This problem is exacerbated for agents who get high initial
claims and, therefore, would be most prone to saving.
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The results here demonstrate that the richest type plays a role in determining the optimal
contract, because the richest type’s incentive constraint binds. If this type of problems could
be studied recursively, an artificial type would need to be added to the state space in addition
to the continuation utility of the equilibrium type. Further development of this idea is the task
of future research.
7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Let Ft+1 denote the discounted (to period t+1) utility of consump-
tion conditional on not finding a job at the beginning of t+ 1,
Ft+1 =
∞∑
s=t+1
βs−(t+1)
(
Πs−1k=t+1(1− akπ)
) [
−Us + βasπ
−Es+1
1− β
]
.
Recall that Dt+1/β
t+1 is the discounted (to period t+ 1) disutility conditional on not finding
a job at the beginning of t+1. Eq. (1) implies that Ft+1 ≥ −Ut+1/(1−β). The I.C. condition
requires that an agent’s benefit of using effort outweighs the cost,
1 ≤ βπ
(
−Et+1
1− β
−
(
Ft+1 −
Dt+1
βt+1
))
≤ βπ
(
−Et+1
1− β
−
(
−Ut+1
1− β
−
Dt+1
βt+1
))
≤ βπ
Ut+1 − Et+1
1− β
+
βπ
1− β + βπ
< βπ
Ut+1 − Et+1
1− β
+ 1,
where the third inequality follows from that Dt+1/β
t+1 ≤ 1/(1− β + βπ). Thus Ut+1 > Et+1.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: Suppose to the contrary that
Ut > πEt+1 + (1− π)Ut+1. (14)
In the following, we use a variational argument to show that the principal could modify σ
to save resources without violating any incentive constraints, which contradicts the optimality
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of σ. Step (i) describes the variation. Step (ii) shows that the variation reduces the cost for
the principal. Steps (iii) and (iv) imply that the contract remains I.C. after the variation.
Specifically, step (iii) shows that the equilibrium type is indifferent, while step (iv) shows that
all the deviators are (weakly) worse off after the variation.
(i) For ǫ > 0, there is a unique δ(ǫ) > 0, such that
u(cUt + ǫ) + β
[
πu(cEt+1 − δ(ǫ)) + (1− π)u(c
U
t+1 − δ(ǫ))
]
= −Ut + β [π(−Et+1) + (1− π)(−Ut+1)] . (15)
Thus δ′(ǫ) = u′(cUt + ǫ)/β[πu
′(cEt+1− δ(ǫ))+ (1−π)u
′(cUt+1− δ(ǫ))]. Eq. (14) implies that
there is a small ǫ¯ > 0, such that δ′(ǫ) > 1/β, for all ǫ ∈ [0, ǫ¯]. Modify the contract by
choosing c˜Ut = c
U
t + ǫ¯, c˜
E
t+1 = c
E
t+1 − δ(ǫ¯), c˜
U
t+1 = c
U
t+1 − δ(ǫ¯).
(ii) The principal saves resources, because ǫ¯ < βδ(ǫ¯).
(iii) The equilibrium type would not secretly save, and his promised utility is unchanged,
given the definition of δ(ǫ).
(iv) All deviators are (weakly) worse off. At the beginning of t, consider a deviator who starts
with savings st ≥ 0, and exerts effort {a˜s}
∞
s=t. Let F1 and F2 be the deviator’s utility
from consumption before and after the modification, respectively.
F1 = max
st≥0
{
u(st + c
U
t − βst+1) + β[a˜tπv
E(st+1 + c
E
t+1) + (1− a˜tπ)v
U (st+1 + c
U
t+1)]
}
,
F2 = max
st≥0
{u(st−1 + c
U
t + ǫ¯− βst+1) + β[a˜tπv
E(st+1 + c
E
t+1 − δ(ǫ¯))
+(1− a˜tπ)v
U (st+1 + c
U
t+1 − δ(ǫ¯))]},
where vE(·), vU (·) are the deviator’s value functions starting from period t+ 1. Then
F2 = F1 +
∫ ǫ¯
0
{u′(st + c
U
t + ǫ− βst+1(ǫ))− β[a˜tπ(v
E)′(st+1(ǫ) + c
E
t+1 − δ(ǫ))
+(1− a˜tπ)(v
U )′(st+1(ǫ) + c
U
t+1 − δ(ǫ))]δ
′(ǫ)}dǫ, (16)
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where st+1(ǫ) is the optimal savings in the maximization problem. If st+1(ǫ) > 0, then
u′(st + c
U
t + ǫ− βst+1(ǫ))
= [a˜tπ(v
E)′(st+1(ǫ) + c
E
t+1 − δ(ǫ)) + (1− a˜tπ)(v
U )′(st+1(ǫ) + c
U
t+1 − δ(ǫ))], thus
u′(st + c
U
t + ǫ− βst+1(ǫ))− β[a˜tπ(v
E)′(st+1(ǫ) + c
E
t+1 − δ(ǫ))
+(1− a˜tπ)(v
U )′(st+1(ǫ) + c
U
t+1 − δ(ǫ))]δ
′(ǫ)
= u′(st + c
U
t + ǫ− βst+1(ǫ))(1 − βδ
′(ǫ))
< 0.
If st+1(ǫ) = 0, then
u′(st + c
U
t + ǫ)− β[a˜tπ(v
E)′(cEt+1 − δ(ǫ)) + (1− a˜tπ)(v
U )′(cUt+1 − δ(ǫ))]δ
′(ǫ)
≤ u′(st + c
U
t + ǫ)− β[a˜tπu
′(cEt+1 − δ(ǫ)) + (1− a˜tπ)u
′(cUt+1 − δ(ǫ))]δ
′(ǫ)
≤ u′(st + c
U
t + ǫ)− β[πu
′(cEt+1 − δ(ǫ)) + (1− π)u
′(cUt+1 − δ(ǫ))]δ
′(ǫ)
≤ u′(cUt + ǫ)− β[πu
′(cEt+1 − δ(ǫ)) + (1− π)u
′(cUt+1 − δ(ǫ))]δ
′(ǫ)
= 0,
where the first inequality follows from the deviator’s non-negative savings (and thus
having higher marginal utility of consumption than the equilibrium type) at t + 1, the
second inequality follows from a˜t ≤ 1 and c
E
t+1 > c
U
t+1, as shown in lemma 1, and the
third inequality follows from st ≥ 0. Therefore, Eq. (16) implies F2 ≤ F1.
Using a similar argument, we can show that if at = 0, then Ut = Ut+1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1: Suppose σ = ({cUs }
∞
s=0, {c
E
s }
∞
s=1, {as}
∞
s=0) is an I.C. contract in
which at ∈ (0, 1) for some t. Consider a family of contracts σ(x) = ({c
U
s }
∞
s=0, {c
E
s }
∞
s=1, {a0, ..., at−1, x, at+1, ...})
where the effort recommendation at in period t is replaced by x ∈ [0, 1]. Since σ = σ(at) is
I.C. and the agent’s utility is linear in x, the agent must be indifferent between any x ∈ [0, 1]
(i.e., V ({a0, ..., at−1, x, at+1, ...}) = V ({a0, ..., at−1, at, at+1, ...}) for any x). Therefore σ(x) is
I.C. for any x ∈ [0, 1].
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Because σ(x) is I.C. for any x ∈ [0, 1] and the principal’s cost function is also linear in x, the
principal must be indifferent between implementing σ(at) and σ(1). Because Ut ≥ Ut+1 > Et+1,
it follows from Lemma 2 and Ut > πEt+1+(1−π)Ut+1 that σ(1) is not optimal. Thus σ = σ(at)
cannot be optimal either. Q.E.D.
Before we prove Lemma 4, we first describe a relaxed problem (19) in the following. We
characterize the solution to this problem in Lemmas A.1-A.5. These results will be used
later.
Let {at}
∞
t=0, at ∈ {0, 1}, be an effort sequence that the principal wants to implement. Let
nt (t ≥ 1) denote the total number of time periods when high effort is recommended before
t, i.e., nt = #{s : as = 1, 0 ≤ s ≤ t − 1}. Define xt = c
U
t−1 − c
U
t = log(Ut/Ut−1)/γ. Then
cUt = c
U
0 −
∑t
s=1 xs. If at = 1, then Eq. (3) yields
cEt+1 = c
U
t −
1
γ
log
(
1− (1− π) exp(γxt+1)
π
)
= cU0 −
t∑
s=1
xs −
1
γ
log
(
1− (1− π) exp(γxt+1)
π
)
;
while if at = 0, Eq. (3) implies that xt+1 = 0, and c
E
t+1 does not need to be specified. The cost
function C(σ) can be decomposed as
C(σ) =
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
Πt−1s=0(1− asπ)
) [
cUt + βatπ
cEt+1
1− β
]
−
βπw
1− β
D0
=
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
Πt−1s=0(1− asπ)
) cU0 −
t∑
s=1
xs + βatπ
cU0 −
∑t
s=1 xs −
1
γ
log
(
1−(1−π) exp(γxt+1)
π
)
1− β


−
βπw
1− β
D0
=
cU0
1− β
−
∞∑
t=1
βt
1− β
(1− π)nt
[
(1 − at−1π)xt + at−1π
1
γ
log
(
1− (1− π) exp(γxt)
π
)]
−
βπw
1− β
D0
=
cU0
1− β
−
∞∑
t=1
βt
1− β
(1− π)ntχ{at−1=1}
[
(1− π)xt + π
1
γ
log
(
1− (1− π) exp(γxt)
π
)]
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−
βπw
1− β
D0,
where χ is the indicator function. Define a function f(x) = −(1−π)x−π 1
γ
log
(
1−(1−π) exp(γx)
π
)
.
Since f(0) = 0, f ′(x) = −1 + π1−(1−π) exp(γx) , f
′(0) = 0, f ′′(x) = π(1 − π)γ(1 − (1 −
π) exp(γx))−2 exp(γx) > 0, we see that f is strictly convex and has a unique minimizer at
x = 0. Thus
C(σ) =
cU0
1− β
+
∞∑
t=1
βt
1− β
(1− π)ntχ{at−1=1}f(xt)−
βπw
1− β
D0. (17)
Next consider a shirker who shirks in all periods up to a given t (a˜s = 0, for all 0 ≤ s ≤ t− 1),
and follows recommended efforts from then on (a˜s = as, for all s ≥ t). Using the same proof
as in Lemma 5, we obtain
V ({a˜s}
∞
s=0) = −
(
Πt−1s=0U
(1−β)βs
s
)
Uβ
t
t
1− β
−Dt.
We study a relaxed problem where only shirkers in the above are considered,
min
σ
C(σ)
s.t. Ut = πEt+1 + (1− π)Ut+1, if at = 1,
Ut = Ut+1, if at = 0,
V¯ = −
U0
1− β
−D0,
V¯ ≥ −
(
Πt−1s=0U
(1−β)βs
s
)
Uβ
t
t
1− β
−Dt, for all t ≥ 1.
Denote the optimal solution to the above by σ∗({at}
∞
t=0). The incentive constraint −
U0
1−β−D0 ≥
−
(
Πt−1s=0U
(1−β)βs
s
)
U
βt
t
1−β −Dt is equivalent to
t∑
s=1
βsxs ≥
1
γ
log
(
U0
1− β
+D0 −Dt
)
−
1
γ
log
(
U0
1− β
)
. (18)
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Using Eqs. (17) and (18), the relaxed problem is rewritten as
min
{xt}∞t=1
∞∑
t=1
βt
1− β
(1− π)ntχ{at−1=1}f(xt) (19)
s.t.
t∑
s=1
βsxs ≥
1
γ
log
(
U0
1− β
+D0 −Dt
)
−
1
γ
log
(
U0
1− β
)
, for all t ≥ 1, (20)
xt = 0, if at−1 = 1.
Lemma A.1 For s < t, if as = 1 and at = 1 (Ds > Ds+1 ≥ Dt > Dt+1), and
Ds−Ds+1
βs+1
≥
Dt−Dt+1
βt+1
, then
1
γ
log( U01−β +D0 −Ds+1)−
1
γ
log( U01−β +D0 −Ds)
βs+1
>
1
γ
log( U01−β +D0 −Dt+1)−
1
γ
log( U01−β +D0 −Dt)
βt+1
.
Proof of Lemma A.1: This follows from the strict concavity of function log(·). Q.E.D.
Lemma A.2 If there is an s ≥ 0, such that at = 1, for all t ≥ s, then σ
∗({at}
∞
t=0) satisfies
s∑
i=1
βixi =
1
γ
log
(
U0
1− β
+D0 −Ds
)
−
1
γ
log
(
U0
1− β
)
.
Proof of Lemma A.2: In the optimal solution, xt ≥ 0, for all t ≥ 1. We also know that
∞∑
t=1
βtxt =
1
γ
log
(
U0
1− β
+D0
)
−
1
γ
log
(
U0
1− β
)
. (21)
By contradiction, suppose
s∑
i=1
βixi >
1
γ
log
(
U0
1− β
+D0 −Ds
)
−
1
γ
log
(
U0
1− β
)
. (22)
Then we will show that
βs+1xs+1 >
1
γ
log
(
U0
1− β
+D0 −Ds+1
)
−
1
γ
log
(
U0
1− β
+D0 −Ds
)
. (23)
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To see this, let s∗ (1 ≤ s∗ ≤ s) be the time index such that
s∗−1∑
i=1
βixi =
1
γ
log
(
U0
1− β
+D0 −Ds∗−1
)
−
1
γ
log
(
U0
1− β
)
,
t∑
i=1
βixi >
1
γ
log
(
U0
1− β
+D0 −Dt
)
−
1
γ
log
(
U0
1− β
)
, s∗ ≤ t ≤ s. (24)
Therefore, βs
∗
xs∗ >
1
γ
log
(
U0
1−β +D0 −Ds∗
)
− 1
γ
log
(
U0
1−β +D0 −Ds∗−1
)
. For ǫ 6= 0, changing
xs∗ by ǫ/β
s∗ and xs+1 by −ǫ/β
s+1 will keep βs
∗
xs∗ +β
s+1xs+1 unchanged. Eqs. in (24) imply
that no constraints in (20) will be violated after the change if ǫ is sufficiently small. Thus the
first-order condition for a minimum at ǫ = 0 is
(1− π)ns∗f ′(xs∗) + (1− π)
ns+1f ′(xs+1) = 0,
which, with the convexity of f , implies that xs+1 > xs∗ . Thus
xs+1 > xs∗
>
1
γ
log
(
U0
1−β +D0 −Ds∗
)
− 1
γ
log
(
U0
1−β +D0 −Ds∗−1
)
βs
∗
>
1
γ
log
(
U0
1−β +D0 −Ds+1
)
− 1
γ
log
(
U0
1−β +D0 −Ds
)
βs+1
,
where the last inequality follows from (Ds∗−1 −Ds∗)/β
s∗ = (βs
∗−1 + (1− π)Ds∗ −Ds∗)/β
s∗ ≥
(1/β − 1)/(1 − β(1 − π)) = (Ds −Ds+1)/β
s+1, and Lemma A.1. That is, Eq. (23) is proved.
Therefore Eqs. (22) and (23) imply
s+1∑
i=1
βixi >
1
γ
log
(
U0
1− β
+D0 −Ds+1
)
−
1
γ
log
(
U0
1− β
)
.
Thus, using the same proof we used for Eq. (23) and by induction, we obtain
βt+1xt+1 >
1
γ
log
(
U0
1− β
+D0 −Dt+1
)
−
1
γ
log
(
U0
1− β
+D0 −Dt
)
, for all t ≥ s,
which contradicts (21). Q.E.D.
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Lemma A.3 If there is an s ≥ 0, such that at = 1, for all t ≥ s, then σ
∗({at}
∞
t=0) satisfies,
for all t ≥ s+ 1,
βtxt =
1
γ
log
(
U0
1− β
+D0 −Dt
)
−
1
γ
log
(
U0
1− β
+D0 −Dt−1
)
. (25)
Thus xt is strictly decreasing in t when t ≥ s+ 1.
Proof of Lemma A.3: For any s′ ≥ s, the conditions in Lemma A.1 (at = 1, for all
t ≥ s′) are satisfied, which implies
s′∑
i=1
βixi =
1
γ
log
(
U0
1− β
+D0 −Ds′
)
−
1
γ
log
(
U0
1− β
)
, for all s′ ≥ s,
which implies (25). When s ≥ t+ 1, (Dt−1 −Dt)/β
t = (βt−1/(1 − β(1 − π)) − βt/(1 − β(1 −
π)))/βt = (1/β − 1)/(1 − β(1 − π)), thus it follows from Eq. (25) and Lemma A.1 that xt is
strictly decreasing in t, when t ≥ s+ 1. Q.E.D.
Lemma A.4 If there is an s ≥ 0, such that at = 1, for all t ≥ s, then σ
∗({at}
∞
t=0) satisfies∑s
i=1 β
i(1− π)niχ{ai−1=1}f(xi)∑s
i=1 β
i(1− π)niχ{ai−1=1}
> f(xs+1), when
s∑
i=1
βi(1− π)niχ{ai−1=1} > 0.
Proof of Lemma A.4: Define x˜t = (log(U0/(1− β) +D0−Dt)− log(U0/(1−β) +D0−
Dt−1))/(γβ
t), for t ≤ s. If at−1 = 0, then x˜t = 0; otherwise, Lemma A.1 implies x˜t > xs+1, for
t ≤ s. Eq. (20) implies
t∑
i=1
βixi ≥
t∑
i=1
βix˜i, for all t ≤ s,
which yields
s∑
i=1
βi(1− π)niχ{ai−1=1}xi ≥
s∑
i=1
βi(1− π)niχ{ai−1=1}x˜i >
(
s∑
i=1
βi(1− π)niχ{ai−1=1}
)
xs+1.
Therefore, the convexity of f and f ′(x) being positive (when x > 0) imply∑s
i=1 β
i(1− π)niχ{ai−1=1}f(xi)∑s
i=1 β
i(1− π)niχ{ai−1=1}
≥ f
(∑s
i=1 β
i(1− π)niχ{ai−1=1}xi∑s
i=1 β
i(1− π)niχ{ai−1=1}
)
> f(xs+1).
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Q.E.D.
Lemma A.5 If there is an s ≥ 1, such that as−1 = 0 and at = 1, for all t ≥ s, then
σ∗({at}
∞
t=0) is dominated by a lottery with two outcomes: either σ
∗({1}∞t=0), or with the com-
plementary probability, σ∗({0}∞t=0). Notice that σ
∗({0}∞t=0) is trivially I.C. and by Lemma 6
and Lemma 7, σ∗({1}∞t=0) satisfies Eq. (5) as well.
Proof of Lemma A.5: Lemma A.2 and A.3 yield that
s−1∑
i=1
βixi =
1
γ
log
(
U0
1− β
+D0 −Ds−1
)
−
1
γ
log
(
U0
1− β
)
,
xs = 0,
βtxt =
1
γ
log
(
U0
1− β
+D0 −Dt
)
−
1
γ
log
(
U0
1− β
+D0 −Dt−1
)
, for all t ≥ s+ 1.
Now construct a new contract σ˜ to implement effort sequence {a˜t}
∞
t=0, where
a˜t = at, if t < s− 1,
a˜t = 1, if t ≥ s− 1.
This implies that {D˜t}
∞
t=0 is
D˜0 = D0 + (1− π)
ns−1
βs−1 − βs
1− β(1 − π)
,
D˜t = Dt + (1− π)
ns−1−nt β
s−1 − βs
1− β(1− π)
, for all t < s− 1,
D˜t =
βt
1− β(1− π)
, for all t ≥ s− 1.
Define {x˜t}
∞
t=0 by
x˜t = xt, for all t ≤ s− 1,
x˜t = xt+1, for all t ≥ s.
We will verify that {x˜t}
∞
t=0 satisfies (20) in the relaxed problem where {a˜t}
∞
t=0 is implemented.
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For t ≤ s− 1,
t∑
i=1
βix˜i =
t∑
i=1
βixi ≥
1
γ
log
(
U0
1− β
+D0 −Dt
)
−
1
γ
log
(
U0
1− β
)
≥
1
γ
log
(
U0
1− β
+ D˜0 − D˜t
)
−
1
γ
log
(
U0
1− β
)
,
where the last inequality follows from D˜0 − D˜t ≤ D0 −Dt. For t ≥ s, we need to show
s−1∑
i=1
βixi +
t∑
i=s
βix˜i =
s−1∑
i=1
βixi +
t∑
i=s
βixi+1
=
1
γ
log
(
U0
1− β
+D0 −Ds−1
)
−
1
γ
log
(
U0
1− β
)
+
1
β
(
1
γ
log
(
U0
1− β
+D0 −Dt+1
)
−
1
γ
log
(
U0
1− β
+D0 −Ds
))
,
≥
1
γ
log
(
U0
1− β
+ D˜0 − D˜t
)
−
1
γ
log
(
U0
1− β
)
.
Since as−1 = 0,Ds = Ds−1, it is equivalent to show that
log
(
U0
1− β
+D0 −Dt+1
)
≥ (1− β) log
(
U0
1− β
+D0 −Ds
)
+ β log
(
U0
1− β
+ D˜0 − D˜t
)
,
which follows from the concavity of log(·) and
D0 −Dt+1 ≥ D0 − βD˜t
≥ D0 − βD˜t − (1− β)Ds + (1− π)
ns−1
(1− β)βs
1− β(1 − π)
= (1− β)(D0 −Ds) + β
(
D0 + (1− π)
ns−1
βs−1 − βs
1− β(1− π)
− D˜t
)
= (1− β)(D0 −Ds) + β(D˜0 − D˜t),
where the second inequality follows from Ds = β
s/(1 − β(1 − π)). Thus σ˜ satisfies the I.C.
constraints in the relaxed problem.
Contract σ˜ is more efficient than σ∗({at}
∞
t=0) in the sense that σ˜ lowers the cost of distortion
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per unit of wage income generated,∑∞
t=1 β
t(1− π)ntχ{at−1=1}f(xt)∑∞
t=1 β
t(1− π)ntχ{at−1=1}
=
∑s−1
t=1 β
t(1− π)ntχ{at−1=1}f(xt) +
∑∞
t=s+1 β
t(1− π)ntf(xt)∑s−1
t=1 β
t(1− π)ntχ{at−1=1} +
∑∞
t=s+1 β
t(1− π)nt
>
∑s−1
t=1 β
t(1− π)ntχ{at−1=1}f(xt) +
∑∞
t=s+1 β
t−1(1− π)ntf(xt)∑s−1
t=1 β
t(1− π)ntχ{at−1=1} +
∑∞
t=s+1 β
t−1(1− π)nt
=
∑s−1
t=1 β
t(1− π)ntχ{at−1=1}f(xt) +
∑∞
t=s β
t(1− π)n˜tf(x˜t)∑s−1
t=1 β
t(1− π)ntχ{at−1=1} +
∑∞
t=s β
t(1− π)n˜t
,
where the inequality follows from Lemma A.3. Hence σ∗({at}
∞
t=0) is dominated by a lottery
with two outcomes: with probability D0/D˜0, the principal uses contract σ˜ to implement efforts
{a˜t}
∞
t=0 and deliver promised utility −U0/(1−β)− D˜0; and with probability (1−D0/D˜0), the
principal implements {0}∞t=0 and delivers utility −U0/(1 − β). This lottery provides the same
ex ante utility, but lowers the cost function C(σ).
If there are still zero efforts remaining in {a˜t}
∞
t=0, we could repeat the above procedure and
move forward the tail sequence of full efforts one step further. Eventually the first outcome in
the lottery will specify at = 1, for all t ≥ 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4: The proof follows from Lemma A.1-A.5. Let {at}
∞
t=0, at ∈ {0, 1},
be an effort sequence that the principal wants to implement. And for s > 0, let ({at}
s−1
t=0 , {1}
∞
t=s)
denote a modified sequence where the effort starting from s is always 1. The solution to the
relaxed problem (19), σ∗({at}
∞
t=0), can be approximated by σ
∗({at}
s−1
t=0 , {1}
∞
t=s) as close as
possible, when s → ∞. Lemma A.5 states that for all s, σ∗({at}
s−1
t=0 , {1}
∞
t=s) is dominated
by lotteries with two outcomes, thus σ∗({at}
∞
t=0) is also dominated by a lottery with two
outcomes. Since the optimal I.C. contract is always dominated by σ∗({at}
∞
t=0), we obtain the
result. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5: Denote the agent’s hidden assets at the beginning of period s by
AUs . Initially the agent has zero asset, A
U
0 = 0. In period s ≥ t, since he will follow strategy
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{as = 1}
∞
s=t, the optimal consumption is the sum of the goods claimed from the principal and
the interest payment (1 − β)AUt , i.e., hidden savings is time invariant after period t. To see
this, notice that Us = πEs+1 + (1 − π)Us+1 and CARA utilities imply, for all s ≥ t,
u′(cUs + (1− β)A
U
t ) = πu
′(cEs+1 + (1− β)A
U
t ) + (1− π)u
′(cUs+1 + (1− β)A
U
t ).
An unemployed agent’s period-t discounted utility of consumption taking AUt as a state variable
is
Ft(A
U
t ) = −
exp(−γcUt )
1− β
exp(−γ(1− β)AUt ) = −
Ut
1− β
exp(−γ(1− β)AUt ).
Now suppose an unemployed agent’s discounted utility of consumption at period s < t is
Fs(A
U
s ) = −x exp(−γ(1−β)A
U
s )/(1−β), where x is a parameter. We can calculate Fs−1(A
U
s−1)
as follows. With probability a˜s−1π, the agent will find a job next period and has a utility
−Es exp(−γ(1− β)A
U
s )/(1 − β), and with probability (1− a˜s−1π), he is still unemployed and
has a utility −x exp(−γ(1 − β)AUs )/(1 − β). The agent’s optimal savings problem at period
s− 1 is
Fs−1(A
U
s−1) = max
cs−1,AUs
− exp(−γcs−1) + β[a˜s−1π(−
Es
1− β
exp(−γ(1 − β)AUs ))
+(1− a˜s−1π)(−
x
1− β
exp(−γ(1− β)AUs ))]
s.t. cs−1 + βA
U
s = A
U
s−1 + c
U
s−1. (26)
The first-order condition is
exp(−γcs−1) = [a˜s−1πEs + (1− a˜s−1π)x] exp(−γ(1− β)A
U
s ). (27)
Substituting Eq. (27) into Eq. (26) yields
cs−1 = (1− β)A
U
s−1 + (1 − β)c
U
s−1 + β log(a˜s−1πEs + (1− a˜s−1π)x)/(−γ)
AUs = A
U
s−1 + log
(
a˜s−1πEs + (1− a˜s−1π)x
Us−1
)
/γ. (28)
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Thus
Fs−1(A
U
s−1) =
− exp(−γcs−1)
1− β
= − exp(−γ(1− β)AUs−1)(exp(−γc
U
s−1))
1−β [a˜s−1πEs + (1− a˜s−1π)x]
β /(1− β)
= −
U1−βs−1 [a˜s−1πEs + (1− a˜s−1π)x]
β
1− β
exp(−γ(1− β)AUs−1).
It follows from the above recursive formula and AU0 = 0 that the agent’s utility in period s = 0
is
−U1−β0 [a˜0πE1 + (1− a˜0π)U
1−β
1 [a˜1πE2 + (1− a˜1π)U
1−β
2 [...[a˜t−1πEt + (1− a˜t−1π)Ut]
β...]β ]β ]β
1− β
.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 6: It is a special case of Lemma A.2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 7: Consider a finite-deviation strategy {a˜s}
∞
s=0, where a˜s = 1,∀s ≥ t+1
for some t. Fix the efforts a˜s (s ≤ t−1) and vary a˜t. Denote the utility in (6) by F ({a˜s}
t−1
s=0, a˜t).
Recall the disutility of {a˜s}
∞
s=0 is
D0({a˜s}
t−1
s=0, a˜t)
=
[
a˜0 + β(1− πa˜0)a˜1 + ...+ β
t
(
Πt−1s=0(1− πa˜s)
)(
a˜t + β(1− πa˜t)
1
1− β(1− π)
)]
.
In the following we only prove that setting a˜t = 1 and keeping other efforts fixed will (weakly)
improve the agent’s utility, i.e.,
F ({a˜s}
t−1
s=0, a˜t)−D0({a˜s}
t−1
s=0, a˜t) ≤ F ({a˜s}
t−1
s=0, 1) −D0({a˜s}
t−1
s=0, 1), (29)
because then the lemma can be proved by backward induction.
First we prove (29) for a simple case, namely, a˜s = 0,∀s ≤ t− 1. Note that
F ({0}t−1s=0, a˜t) = −
(
Πts=0U
(1−β)βs
s
)
(a˜tπEt+1 + (1− a˜tπ)Ut+1)
βt+1
1− β
is a convex function of a˜t, andD0({0}
t−1
s=0, a˜t) is a linear function. It follows from F ({0}
t−1
s=0, 0)−
D0({0}
t−1
s=0, 0) = F ({0}
t−1
s=0, 1)−D0({0}
t−1
s=0, 1) and the convexity of F ({0}
t−1
s=0, a˜t) that (29) holds.
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Second we prove
(F ({a˜s}
t−1
s=0, 1)−D0({a˜s}
t−1
s=0, 1)) − (F ({a˜s}
t−1
s=0, a˜t)−D0({a˜s}
t−1
s=0, a˜t))
=
∫ 1
a˜t
(
∂F ({a˜s}
t−1
s=0, a)
∂a
−
∂D0({a˜s}
t−1
s=0, a)
∂a
)
da ≥ 0,
for the general case.
∂D0({a˜s}
t−1
s=0,a)
∂a
= βt
(
Πt−1s=0(1− πa˜s)
) 1−β
1−β(1−π) is independent of a. It can
be derived from (6) that
∂F ({a˜s}
t−1
s=0, a)
∂a
= βt
(
Πt−1s=0(1− πa˜s)
) Ut −Et
1− β
exp
(
−γ(1− β)AUt ({a˜s}
t−1
s=0, a)
)
,
where AUt ({a˜s}
t−1
s=0, a) is the hidden savings at the beginning of t, conditional on the strategy
({a˜s}
t−1
s=0, a). It follows from (28) that the always-shirking-up-to-(t − 1) type saves the most,
i.e.,
AUt ({a˜s}
t−1
s=0, a) ≤ A
U
t ({0}
t−1
s=0, a),
which implies that
∂F ({a˜s}
t−1
s=0, a)
∂a
/
∂D0({a˜s}
t−1
s=0, a)
∂a
≥
∂F ({0}t−1s=0, a)
∂a
/
∂D0({0}
t−1
s=0, a)
∂a
,
meaning that the always-shirking type has an advantage in shirking in period t.
Hence ∫ 1
a˜t
(
∂F ({a˜s}
t−1
s=0, a)
∂a
−
∂D0({a˜s}
t−1
s=0, a)
∂a
)
da
=
∂D0({a˜s}
t−1
s=0, a)
∂a
∫ 1
a˜t
(
∂F ({a˜s}
t−1
s=0, a)
∂a
/
∂D0({a˜s}
t−1
s=0, a)
∂a
− 1
)
da
≥
∂D0({a˜s}
t−1
s=0, a)
∂a
∫ 1
a˜t
(
∂F ({0}t−1s=0, a)
∂a
/
∂D0({0}
t−1
s=0, a)
∂a
− 1
)
da
≥ 0,
where the last inequality follows from F ({0}t−1s=0, a˜t)−D0({0}
t−1
s=0, a˜t) ≤ F ({0}
t−1
s=0, 1)−D0({0}
t−1
s=0, 1).
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 2: Lemma A.3 states
βtxt =
1
γ
log
(
−V¯ −
βt
1− β(1− π)
)
−
1
γ
log
(
−V¯ −
βt−1
1− β(1− π)
)
.
Therefore limt→∞ xt = (1− β)/(γ(−V¯ )β(1− β(1− π))) > 0. Recall that Ut/Ut−1 = exp(γxt).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: In Hopenhayn and Nicolini [4], if the principal always imple-
ments high efforts, then {Ut}
∞
t=0 is monotonically increasing. We will show
lim
t→∞
Ut =∞. (30)
Suppose to the contrary that limt→∞ Ut =M for some 0 < M <∞. Inverse Euler equation
1
Ut
=
π
Et+1
+
1− π
Ut+1
(31)
implies that limt→∞Et =M . Let W
U
t be the promised utility for an agent who has not found
a job at the beginning of t. It is easily seen that
WUt ≥ −
∞∑
s=t
βs−tUs ≥ −
M
1− β
,
which violates the incentive constraint βπ(−Et/(1−β)−W
U
t ) ≥ 1 for exerting effort for large
t.
Secondly we show that
lim sup
t→∞
(Ut+1 − Ut) <∞. (32)
Eq. (31) and Ut < Ut+1 imply that Et < Ut < Ut+1. Thus
Ut+1 − Ut
1− β
<
Ut+1 − Et+1
1− β
<
∞∑
s=t+1
βs−(t+1)Us −
Et+1
1− β
= WUt+1 −
Et+1
1− β
=
1
βπ
,
where the last equality follows from the binding incentive constraint.
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Thirdly, we have
WUt+2 −
Et+2
1− β
=
1
βπ
, (33)
Ut+1 + βW
U
t+2 −
Et+1
1− β
=WUt+1 −
Et+1
1− β
=
1
βπ
. (34)
Substituting Eq. (33) into Eq. (34) yields
(1− β)Ut+1 + βEt+2 −Et+1 =
(1− β)2
βπ
. (35)
Substituting Eq. (31) into Eq. (35) yields
(Ut+2 − Ut+1) =
Mt(Ut+1 − Ut)−
(1−β)2
βπ
Nt
, (36)
whereMt = (Ut+(Ut+1−Ut))/(πUt+(Ut+1−Ut)), Nt = (β(1−π)Ut+1)/(πUt+1+(Ut+2−Ut+1)).
Rewrite Eq. (36) as
(Ut+2 − Ut+1)−C =
Mt
Nt
[(Ut+1 − Ut)− C] +
(Mt −Nt)C −
(1−β)2
βπ
Nt
,
where C = (1 − β)2/(β(1 − β(1 − π))). Eqs. (30) and (32) imply that limt→∞Mt = 1/π and
limt→∞Nt = β(1 − π)/π. Therefore limt→∞Mt/Nt = 1/(β(1 − π)) > 1 and limt→∞((Mt −
Nt)C − (1 − β)
2/(βπ))/Nt = 0. For any ǫ > 0 (ǫ < (1/(β(1 − π)) − 1)/4), there is a t
∗, such
that if t ≥ t∗,
Mt
Nt
≥
1
β(1 − π)
− ǫ, and
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(Mt −Nt)C −
(1−β)2
βπ
Nt
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ2.
So if |Ut+1 − Ut − C| ≥ ǫ,
|Ut+2 − Ut+1 − C| ≥ (
1
β(1− π)
− ǫ) |Ut+1 − Ut − C| − ǫ
2
≥ (
1
β(1− π)
− 2ǫ) |Ut+1 − Ut −C|
≥
1
β(1−π) + 1
2
|Ut+1 − Ut − C| .
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By induction, |Ut+2 − Ut+1 − C| will grow at a geometric rate, contradicting Eq. (32). There-
fore when t ≥ t∗, |Ut+2 − Ut+1 − C| ≤ ǫ. Thus Eq. (13) holds. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: If V¯ a > V¯ b, then it follows from Eq. (8) that −Ua0 > −U
b
0 and
from Eq. (12) that limt→∞U
a
t /U
a
t−1 > limt→∞ U
b
t /U
b
t−1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: Lemma A.3 states that xt > xt+1 > 0, for all t ≥ 1. We will
show that both cEt − c
U
t and c
E
t − c
E
t+1 are strictly decreasing in t.
Eq. (3) implies
exp(−γ(cUt−1 − c
U
t )) = π exp(−γ(c
E
t − c
U
t )) + (1− π),
which implies that cEt − c
U
t is decreasing. Eq. (3) also implies
exp(−γcEt+1)
exp(−γcEt )
=
exp(−γcUt )− (1− π) exp(−γc
U
t+1)
exp(−γcUt−1)− (1− π) exp(−γc
U
t )
= exp(γxt)
(
1 + (1− π) exp(γxt+1)
exp(γ(xt − xt+1))− 1
1− (1− π) exp(γxt)
)
.
Since exp(γxt), (xt − xt+1), and 1/(1 − (1 − π) exp(γxt)) are all decreasing in t, we conclude
that cEt − c
E
t+1 is decreasing in t. Finally
Nt = c
U
t +
w − cEt
1− β
− β
w − cEt+1
1− β
− = w − (cEt − c
U
t )−
β(cEt − c
E
t+1)
1− β
is strictly increasing in t. Q.E.D.
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